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Abstract 
 In this paper we introduce a model of arbitration decision making which generalizes several 
previous models of both conventional arbitration and final offer arbitration.  We derive the 
equilibrium offers that risk neutral disputants would propose, and show how these offers would 
vary under different arbitration procedures.  In particular, we show that optimal offers made under 
conventional arbitration will always be more extreme than those made under final offer arbitration. 
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Introduction 
 Although bargaining is central to the operation of a free market economy, there are times 
when two sides are unable to come to an agreement, especially in the case of wage bargaining 
between management and labor.  The traditional alternative to an agreement is a strike or lockout, 
but this can impose considerable costs not only on the disputants but also on other parties who have 
a stake in the outcome (such as investors, customers and suppliers).  Hence dispute resolution 
mechanisms which provide alternatives to strike action are of considerable practical interest, 
especially in key industries, in the public sector, and in professional sports (see e.g. Marburger & 
Scoggins 1996).  One of the most common of these alternatives is arbitration. 
 In Conventional Arbitration (CA), a third party arbitrator listens to the two sides propose 
settlements, and then based upon these two offers and the arbitrator's own view of the facts of the 
case, the arbitrator imposes what he sees as a fair settlement.  This settlement may be the same as 
one of the disputant's proposals, or it may be a compromise between the two, or it may be some 
completely different value; in principle, almost any result is possible.  Most models of arbitrator 
behavior in this context (e.g. Farber & Bazerman 1986, Bloom 1986) view the arbitrator decision 
process as some form of averaging of the two disputant's offers along with the arbitrator's notion of 
a fair settlement. Thus the arbitrated settlement could be formulated as  
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where ya and yb are the suggestions of the disputants, y0 is the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement 
based on the publicly observable facts of the dispute, and 0  w  1 is a weighting factor.  Note 
that the settlements suggested by the disputants are each given equal consideration in this model. 
 Another commonly used arbitration process is Final Offer Arbitration (FOA), introduced in 
part to correct some of the perceived deficiencies of CA, especially for public sector labor disputes. 
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Stevens (1966) was the first to argue that the offers of the disputants in CA seemed to matter too 
much, in that a disputant might make an extreme offer to try to sway an arbitration award in their 
favor.  He suggested FOA as a way to pressure the parties to make more reasonable offers and 
thereby settle.  The resolution process in this type of arbitration is simple: each disputant proposes a 
settlement (their "best and final" offer) and then the arbitrator chooses the one that seems to be the 
most fair (i.e. the one that is closest to the arbitrator's opinion of a fair settlement). The arbitrator is 
not permitted to assign any compromise of the two offers, but must choose one or the other "as-is".  
Thus the settlement could be modeled as 
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 The proponents of FOA had originally argued that the threat of having the other party's 
offer chosen would be sufficient to force the disputants' offers to converge to an agreement. 
However, the work by Farber (1980), Crawford (1982) and Brams & Merrill (1983) showed that 
the final offers would typically not converge. As a result FOA appeared to lose some of its original 
appeal, although it continued to be used in practice and to be studied both empirically (Marburger 
& Scoggins 1996) and analytically (Samuelson 1991). 
 Aside from FOA and CA, a number of other arbitration methods have been proposed in the 
literature.  The main goal has been to find an arbitration procedure that would encourage the two 
disputants to converge to an agreement, without requiring the arbitrator to impose one.  For 
example, Zeng et al (1996) suggested a procedure in which each side would submit two "final" 
offers to the arbitrator, who would then compare them according to a specified procedure.  While 
this and other novel methods (see Zeng et al 1996 for a partial listing) do have some future 
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potential, their actual use has been rather limited to date.  FOA and CA still seem to predominate in 
practice and so are worthy of continued academic attention. 
 In this paper our objective is to develop an improved model of arbitrator behavior that is 
more general than previous models of arbitration.  In particular, our model incorporates what we 
call the Closest Offer Principle (COP), in which we permit an arbitrator to put a higher weight on 
the disputant's offer which is closest to the arbitrator's own assessment.  In effect, the arbitrator may 
choose to reward the disputant who comes closest to his opinion of a fair settlement and punish the 
disputant who is furthest away.  We believe that this model is more reflective of the decision 
making of real arbitrators, who might quite reasonably wish to give more consideration to 
"reasonable" offers while largely discounting those seen as too "extreme".  More importantly, this 
innovation allows our model to generalize previous models of both CA and FOA, and so permits us 
to directly compare their behavior analytically. 
 Our work is most similar to that of Brams & Merrill (1983), who performed a thorough 
analytical study of the equilibrium offers under FOA for risk neutral disputants.  Our analysis goes 
a step further however to examine the equilibrium offers of both FOA and CA, and to subsequently 
compare their relative convergence properties.  In making this comparison, our analytical work 
complements the empirical work by Ashenfelter et al (1992), which studied the performance of 
FOA and CA in an experimental context.  We do not address the important question of how the 
impending use of an arbitration procedure might affect the preceding bargaining sessions (as in 
Farber & Bazerman 1989).  We also ignore the issue of whether a given arbitration method 
encourages a settlement that is truly "economically efficient" as opposed to being merely a 
pragmatic compromise (see Crawford 1979). 
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 In the next section of the paper, we define more precisely our model and show how it is a 
generalization of both previous CA models and also of FOA models. After that, we derive the 
equilibrium offers that disputants would make under the assumptions that the arbitrator is unbiased 
and the disputants are risk neutral. We then compare these equilibrium offers to those of FOA, and 
show that although FOA generally does not guarantee complete convergence of offers to a single 
point, in all cases it does at least induce more convergence than CA would. We conclude with a 
discussion of our results. 
The Model 
 Two parties, Disputant A and Disputant B, are entering arbitration. As with most other 
treatments of this topic, we assume here that there is only one issue in dispute, and that it can be 
described by a single number (as in e.g. the proposed salary of a professional athlete); we do not 
consider arbitration over multiple issues (see Crawford 1979).  Disputant A would like the 
settlement to be as small as possible, while Disputant B would like it as large as possible.  In the 
arbitration hearing, each disputant proposes a settlement for the dispute (presumably along with a 
variety of supporting arguments and other discussion).  We denote the settlement suggested by 
Disputant A with a, and that of Disputant B with b. 
 We assume that the arbitrator's initial idea of a fair settlement, s0, is a random variable 
having a density function f(x), cumulative distribution F(x), and mean . Both parties know that the 
arbitrator's opinion is drawn from f(x).  Moreover, both parties know that the arbitrator will 
choose a final settlement S according to  
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That is, the arbitrator will choose the final settlement to be a weighted average of 
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(a) the initial assessment s0, which is given a weight   [0,1]; and 
(b) a weighted average of the settlements a and b suggested by the parties, where the weight   
[1/2,1] is assigned to the party whose offer is closest to the arbitrator's initial assessment. 
 This model of arbitrator behavior is of interest because it includes several other previous 
models as special cases: 
(a) if we set  = 0 and  = 1 so that all of the weight is given to the closest disputant's offer, our 
model reduces to that of regular FOA (as in Farber 1980); 
(b) if we let   (0,1) and  = 0.5 so that the two disputants' offers are given equal weight and then 
averaged with the arbitrator opinion, our model reduces to equation 1, which has been used in many 
previous CA models (e.g. Farber & Bazerman 1986); 
(c) if we set  = 1 then the disputants' offers are ignored and the arbitrator imposes her own opinion 
as the final settlement ("autocratic arbitration").  This has also been used as a model of CA (see 
Ashenfelter et al 1992); and, 
(d) if we set  = 0 and  = 0.5 so that the disputants' offers are given equal weight while the 
arbitrator's opinion is ignored, our model simplifies to a compromise "splitting of the difference". 
 Our model also has some resemblance to (but does not quite generalize) a variation of FOA 
proposed by Brams & Merrill (1986).  In this variant the arbitrator will choose offer a, or offer b, or 
her own opinion s0, but never a compromise or average of any of these.  In terms of our model, this 
would be equivalent to setting  = 1 and then having  take a value of either 0 or 1 depending on 
the relative position of the offers. 
Analysis 
 Having defined a model of the arbitration process, we now determine its properties; in 
particular, we want to derive the equilibrium offers that each disputant would suggest, and see how 
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these offers would vary in different types of arbitration. To do so we shall make two additional 
assumptions that are commonly used in this kind of modeling: 
(a) the arbitrator is unbiased, in the sense that the density function for his opinion is symmetric 
about the mean, i.e. f( - x) = f( + x) for all x; and, 
(b) both parties are risk-neutral and hence, Disputant A simply wants to minimize the expected 
value of the settlement while Disputant B wants to maximize it. 
 We begin by defining the indicator variable  as  
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Thus  indicates which of the two offers is closest to the arbitrator's opinion.  For convenience, we 
also define Fm = F( [a+b]/2 ) and fm = f( [a+b]/2 ).  The arbitration settlement S can now be written 
as  
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Taking expectations leads to an expression for the expected arbitration settlement: 
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Disputant A would like to minimize this expectation, while Disputant B would like to maximize it. 
 To determine the equilibrium offers, we solve the first-order conditions /a E[S] = 0 and  
/b E[S] = 0 to get 
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Adding and subtracting these equations gives  
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Given our the assumption that s0 follows a symmetric distribution, these equations imply that  
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Solving these for optimal values a* and b* yields  
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Using second-order conditions, it is straightforward to verify (as in Brams & Merrill 1983) that this 
pair of values is in fact a saddle point.  Note that these equilibrium offers are equidistant from the 
mean  of the arbitrator's distribution, and that  must be strictly larger than 1/2 if these optimal 
values are to be finite.  The range R between them is  
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This range R  0 only in the degenerate case where f()  ; i.e. the offers fully converge only in 
the case where the arbitrator's opinion is known with certainty. 
 In the particular case where s0 follows a normal distribution with standard deviation , the 
equilibrium offers are  
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 These offers have several interesting implications.  Firstly, as previous authors have noted 
in their own studies of FOA, the presence of the term f() in the denominator of the above 
equations suggests that offers will tend to be closer together when the disputants have good 
knowledge about the arbitrator's likely opinion (i.e. the density at the mean is relatively high and so 
there is less probability mass in the tails of the distribution).  Conversely, they will generally be 
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farther apart when the arbitrator's opinion is difficult to predict (i.e. the density at the mean is low 
and there is more mass in the tails).  This might be the case where an arbitrator is new to the 
industry or has a reputation for wildly varying awards. 
 The next point of interest is the absence of the  term in the equilibrium offers. That is, the 
weight the arbitrator attaches to her own opinion has no affect on these offers. This is evident in the 
structure of the equation for the expected settlement, which has the form 
  ),()1( bagconstantSE   .     (14) 
Clearly, values of a and b which optimize g(a,b) also optimize the overall settlement. In effect, the 
fact that the arbitrator is going to allocate a certain portion of the available resources by fiat does 
not influence the strategies that risk neutral disputants will use in gaming for whatever resources 
remain "in play". 
 More importantly, note how the equilibrium offers change as the weight  on the closest 
offer changes; as less weight is assigned to the closer offer, the offers become more extreme and 
the range R between them grows.  In particular, under FOA (where  = 1) the offers would be 
relatively close together (how close depends on f()); for example, in the case of a normal 
distribution the offers would be  
2
*
2
 FOAa  and 
2
*
2
 FOAb  .   (15) 
to give a range of  
2
2**
2
 FOAFOAFOA abR .    (16) 
22 Aug 2001 Closest Offer Principle Armstrong & Hurley 
 10 
In contrast, under the traditional model of CA (i.e. where   0.5), the range would in principle be 
infinite. In fact, taking the ratio of the ranges for arbitration with any weight  <1 as compared to 
FOA would give  
112
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      (17) 
which shows that any value of  <1 will lead to more extreme offers than would FOA. Thus 
although FOA does not completely succeed in inducing the two disputants to make convergent 
offers, it none the less leads to closer offers than any other variation of CA would.  More generally, 
the less an arbitrator deliberately favors the closer offer, the less incentive disputants have to make 
a reasonable offer, and so the more extreme those offers become. 
 We would like to emphasize here that this effect of the closest offer weight  is obtained 
without any requirement for risk aversion on the part of the disputants. A heavier weight, with FOA 
as the extreme case, is sufficient to induce even risk neutral disputants to make more reasonable 
offers than would be expected under a traditional CA model. 
Conclusion 
 In this article we have introduced a model of arbitration which allows for what we call the 
Closest Offer Principle, in which an arbitrator performing conventional arbitration is permitted to 
give more consideration to what they consider the most reasonable of the two disputant's offers. 
Under the assumptions that the arbitrator is unbiased and that the disputants are risk neutral, we 
then derived the equilibrium offers that the disputants would propose, and showed how these offers 
would vary as the structure of the arbitration procedure was varied.  In particular, we showed that 
the concluding offers made under Conventional Arbitration (CA) would always be more extreme 
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than those made under Final Offer Arbitration (FOA), even without assuming risk aversion on the 
part of the disputants. 
 Based upon the results of our analysis, in practice we would recommend the use of FOA in 
preference to CA because FOA should encourage the parties to make less extreme offers.  In 
making this recommendation however we must note several limitations of our study.  For one 
thing, our analysis assumes that both parties are risk neutral, whereas in reality each party is likely 
to show some degree of risk aversion (particularly employees involved in wage negotiations; see 
Marburger & Scoggins 1996).  We believe that our results will extend naturally to cover the risk 
averse case, but this conjecture remains to be proven.  It also unclear how the choice between these 
two arbitration procedures might affect (either rationally or emotionally) the negotiations that 
precede the (potential) arbitration process.  Further study will be needed to address these questions. 
 We believe that our model does provide two main contributions to the study of arbitration. 
Firstly, although it is still quite simplistic, we think that it does provide a more reasonable 
description of how real arbitrators can and do make their decisions. They should not be thought to 
blindly give equal weight to both competing offers, but to instead use their judgement to give more 
consideration to what they perceive to be "reasonable" offers than to "unreasonable" ones. 
Secondly, the model is an improvement in that its structure is a generalization of existing models of 
both CA and also of FOA.  This generalization allows a straightforward comparison of the 
equilibrium offers made under each type of arbitration and in any other intermediate variations 
thereof. 
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